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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a permissive appeal from the district court's interlocutory Order
Regarding Defendant's Competence to stand trial, filed December 6, 2010. On
appeal, the state challenges the district court's ruling that it was prevented by
"law of the case" from making a binding retrospective determination of Hawkins'
competency to stand trial and represent himself in his 2008 trial for two counts of
robbery.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Hawkins was tried and convicted of two counts of robbery in 2008.
(#35281 R., Vol. I, p.197; Vol. II, pp.276-78. 1) See also State v. Hawkins, 148
Idaho 774, 229 P.3d 379 (Ct. App. 2009) (review denied 4/29/1 0). He appealed
and, on appeal, argued that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sua
sponte order a psychiatric evaluation and conduct a hearing to determine his

competence to stand trial.

Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 777, 229 P.3d at 382.

Following an extensive recitation of the facts and a discussion of the legal
principles governing the determination of when a district court must order a
competency evaluation, the Idaho Court of Appeals agreed with Hawkins and
vacated his conviction, holding: "[T]he district court should have entertained a
reasonable doubt about Hawkins' mental competency either to stand trial or to

1

By order of the Idaho Supreme Court, the appellate record in this case has
been augmented with the clerk's record and transcripts in Hawkins' prior appeal,
Supreme· Court Docket No. 35281. (See Order To Augment The Record,
entered November 9, 2011.)
1

represent himself. Therefore, the district court's failure to sua sponte order a
mental evaluation and make a determination as to Hawkins' competency was an
abuse of discretion."

~

at 783, 229 P.3d at 388.

concluded its analysis by stating:

The Court of Appeals

"Because it is not possible to retroactively

make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried, we
must vacate the judgment of conviction and leave the state free to retry Hawkins
if he is found to be competent to stand trial."

~

(footnote omitted). The Court

remanded the case to the district court "for further proceedings in accordance
with [its] opinion." .!5;l
On remand, the district court ordered Hawkins to undergo a competency
evaluation pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-211 and 18-212. (R., pp.29-30, 34-36, 39.)
Hawkins was evaluated by two different mental health professionals, licensed
psychologist Dr. Chad Sombke and licensed psychiatrist Dr. Michael Estess.
(11/12/1 0 Tr., p.9, L.14 - p.12, L.15, p.59, L.22 - p.60, L.18, p.67, L.18 - p.68,
L.19; State's Exhibits 5 and 6.) At a hearing on the competency issue, both
doctors opined, based on their interactions with Hawkins, his responses to
testing,

and

other collateral

information regarding

Hawkins' social and

institutional history, that Hawkins is competent to stand trial. (11/12/1 0 Tr., p.16,
L.6 - p.46, L.5, p.53, L.2 - p.54, L.2, p.68, L.20 - p.95, L.3.) Specifically, Dr.
Sombke testified that Hawkins is neither delusional nor psychotic; he is
competent, understands the proceedings against him and is capable of assisting
in his own defense. (11/12/10 Tr., p.28, L.16- p.46, L.5, p.53, L.2- p.56, L.13.)
Dr. Estess likewise testified that Hawkins is "perfectly competent" to stand trial,
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that "he is not psychotic and not delusional," and that there is "nothing about him
... that would preclude his ability to confer with his attorney in his own defense or
to understand the nature and circumstances of his legal difficulties." (11 /12/10
Tr., p.91, L.24- p.95, L.3.)
Dr. Estess further testified that he and his staff had numerous prior
contacts with Hawkins during the two-year period he was housed in the Ada
County Jail pending his trial in 2008.

(11/12/10 Tr., p.62, L.8 - p.63, L.25.)

Between 2006 and 2008, neither Dr. Estess, his staff, nor jail staff believed that
Hawkins suffered from any mental illness.

(11/12/10 Tr., p.64, L.14- p.67,

L.17.) Dr. Estess characterized Hawkins as "arrogant[,} narcissi[stic], paranoid,
inadequate, dependent, dishonest, antisocial ... angry, petulant, manipulative,
deceitful, and dishonest, and coy." (11/12/10 Tr., p.65, Ls.16-22.) He opined,
however, that at the time he was tried in January 2008, Hawkins "was perfectly
competent to understand the nature of the proceedings, to confer with an
attorney in his own defense and understand what was going on. . .. [B]asically,
... hewascompetenttostandtrial." (11/12/10Tr., pp.99, L.18-p.100, L.19.)
Based on the totality of the evidence presented to it, "including the
admitted exhibits and testimony presented during the competency hearing," the
district court found that Hawkins "is able to assist in his own defense and is
capable of understanding [the] nature of the proceedings" and is therefore
presently competent to stand trial. (R., p.135.) The court also found by clear
and convincing evidence that Hawkins "understood the nature of the proceedings
against him and was able to assist in his own defense at the time he went to trial
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in this case in January 2008" and, thus, made the retroactive finding that
Hawkins was competent during the 2008 trial. (R., pp.135-36.) Despite having
made this latter determination, the district court concluded it was bound by what
it deemed to be the "law of the case" and a controlling directive of the Idaho
Court of Appeals to grant Hawkins a new trial. (R., p.136; see also R., pp.27374, ) Specifically, the court ruled:
Although this Court has made the retroactive finding that the
Defendant was competent to proceed to trial in January 2008, this
Court is constrained by the law of the case and is bound to follow
the remittitur of the Idaho Court of Appeals. Accordingly, this Court
must retry this case and will set this case for a new trial.
(R., p.136.)

The state timely moved the district court for permission to file an
interlocutory appeal from its December 6, 2010 Order Regarding Defendant's
Competence, which granted Hawkins a new trial. (R., pp.243-52.) The district
court entered an order granting the motion on February 1, 2011. (R., pp.272-76.)
The state thereafter moved the Idaho Supreme Court for permission to appeal
from the district court's December 6, 201 0 order.

(Motion For Acceptance Of

Appeal By Permission And Statement In Support Thereof, filed February 15,
2011.) The Court granted the state's motion on April 27, 2011. (Order Granting
Motion For Acceptance Of Appeal By Permission, entered April 27, 2011; see
also R., p.373 (order attached to notice of appeal).)
notice of appeaL (R., pp.367-73.)

4

The state filed a timely

ISSUE
In a single concluding sentence, unaccompanied by any analysis or
citation to legal authority, the Court of Appeals in Hawkins' prior appeal stated:
"Because it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins'
competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction
and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand
trial." State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 783, 229 P.3d 379, 388 (Ct. App. 2009)
(footnote omitted). Did the district court erroneously conclude that this statement
is "law of the case" that required it to order a new trial and prevented it from
making a binding retroactive determination of Hawkins' competency to stand trial
in the 2008 proceedings?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erroneously Concluded It Was Prevented By "Law Of The
Case" From Making A Binding Retroactive Competency Determination
A.

Introduction
The district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Hawkins

was mentally competent to stand trial in 2008. (R., pp.135-36.) Despite having
made this finding, the court determined that a new trial is necessary based on
the Court of Appeals' concluding statement in Hawkins' prior appeal that:
"Because it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins'
competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction
and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand
trial." State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 783, 229 P.3d 379, 388 (Ct. App. 2009)
(footnote omitted). The district court recognized that there is "clearly precedent
for a retroactive psychological evaluation" (11/12/10 Tr., p.3, Ls.21-24; see also
R., p.273 ("[T]here is case authority in other jurisdictions for this Court to make a

retroactive competency decision.")), but concluded that the Court of Appeals'
statement that such a retroactive determination "is not possible" and that
Hawkins may be retried if he is presently competent constitutes the "law of the
case," which it was constrained to follow (R., pp.136, 273-74).
The district court erred in concluding it was prevented by "law of the case"
from making a binding retroactive competency determination. Application of the
law to the facts of this case shows that the Court of Appeals' statement that "it is
not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at
the time he was tried," is not "law of the case" because, in addition to being
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unnecessary to the resolution of the only issue raised by Hawkins on appeal, the
statement was rendered without analysis or citation to authority, and is contrary
both to existing precedent and to the facts that have been developed on remand.
Because the statement is not "law of the case," it does not prevent the district
court either from making a binding retroactive determination of Hawkins'
competency in the 2008 proceedings or from declining to order a retrial.

B.

The Statement At Issue Is Not "Law Of The Case" And Does Not Prevent
The District Court Either From Making A Binding Retroactive
Determination Of Hawkins' Competency To Stand Trial In The 2008
Proceedings Or From Declining To Order A Retrial
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently articulated the "law of the

case" doctrine as follows:
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme
Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle
or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement
becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout
its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon
subsequent appeal."
Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009) (citations
omitted);

accord,~.

Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812,

816, 153 P.3d 1158,1162 (2007); Dachletv. State, 1361daho 752,759,40 P.3d
110, 117 (2002); Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283
(2001); Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000). The
doctrine also extends to cases decided by the Idaho Court of Appeals.
Swanson, 134 Idaho at 516, 5 P.3d at 977. Although the doctrine "posits" that
rules of law previously decided "should continue to govern the same issues in
subsequent stages in the same case," the United States Supreme Court has
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noted that "[l]aw of the case directs a court's discretion, it does not limit the
tribunal's power." Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) (citations and
footnote omitted), guoted in Stuart, 136 Idaho at 495, 36 P.3d at 1283.
The district court concluded the Court of Appeals' statement in Hawkins'
prior appeal that "it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to
Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" was the "law of the case" that
prevented

the

court

from

making

a

binding

retroactive

competency

determination, despite having found by clear and convincing evidence that
Hawkins was competent during his January 2008 trial. (R., pp.135-36, 273-74;
see also 11/12/10 Tr., p.3, L.2 - p.4, L.21.) There are, however, at least two
reasons why the district court erred.
First and foremost, the statement at issue was not necessary to the Court
of Appeals' resolution of the only issue(s) it identified on appeal- re., "whether
in the course of Hawkins' self-representation, the district court should have
considered sua sponte whether Hawkins was competent to undergo trial, and if
so, whether Hawkins was rational enough to represent himself rather than be
represented by counsel." State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 779, 229 P.3d 379,
384 (Ct. App. 2009).

Whether Hawkins could or could not be retroactively

deemed competent following a competency evaluation on remand had no
bearing on the question actually before the Court of Appeals- whether the trial
court should have entertained a bona fide doubt about Hawkins' competency
such that it should have sua sponte ordered an evaluation at the time of trial.
Because the question of whether it is possible to make a retroactive

8

determination of Hawkins' competency to stand trial in 2008 was neither
necessary nor relevant to the Court of Appeals' determination that the trial court
should have ordered a competency evaluation during the 2008 proceedings, it
does not appear under established principles of law,

~.

Taylor, 146 Idaho

at 709,201 P.3d at 1286; Stuart, 136 Idaho at 495,36 P.3d at 1283, that the
Court of Appeals' statement that a retroactive determination of Hawkins'
competency "is not possible" is actually "law of the case."
Second, although the Court of Appeals expressed its view, apparently
based on the record before it, that it is not possible to retroactively determine
Hawkins' competency when he was tried in 2008, there is no indication that the
words chosen were actually intended by the Court to limit the trial court's power
on remand to make its own findings regarding whether such a determination is
possible. On this point, the reasoning of Stuart v. State, supra, is instructive.
After Stuart was convicted of first degree murder, he petitioned for postconviction relief, alleging that the county sheriff had recorded confidential
conversations he had with his attorney while he was in jail. Stuart, 136 Idaho at
491-92, 36 P.3d at 1279-80. The district court summarily dismissed the petition,
but the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that Stuart had presented
sufficient facts to warrant an evidentiary hearing on his claim.

lsL. at 492, 36 P.3d

at 1280. The Idaho Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court and
stated, '"if such attorney-client conversations are found to have been recorded,
the State will be required to show that the evidence at trial had an origin
independent of the eavesdropping."'

lsL.

9

at 495, 36 P.3d at 1283 (emphasis

original) (citation omitted).

Following an evidentiary hearing on remand, the

district court found that the attorney-client conversations had been monitored,
but held "that under the independent origin, inevitable discovery, and attenuated
basis exceptions, the monitoring of telephone conversations did not lead to the
discovery of witnesses" and, therefore, did not violate Stuart's constitutional
rights. JJ;t at 492, 494, 36 P.3d at 1280, 1282.
On appeal from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition following the
evidentiary hearing on remand, Stuart argued that the Idaho Supreme Court's
statement in his prior appeal that the state would "be required to show that the
evidence at trial had an origin independent of the eavesdropping" was "law of the
case" and, as such, the lower court was not at liberty to apply other exceptions to
the exclusionary rule when rendering its decision.

JJt

at 495, 36 P.3d at 1283.

The Idaho Supreme Court rejected Stuart's argument, noting that its prior
opinion "provided little discussion as to why [the Court] chose to state that the
State had to prove 'an origin independent of the eavesdropping."'

JJt

The Court

noted that, as authority for its prior holding, it had cited a United States Supreme
Court decision that discussed both the independent and attenuated basis
exceptions to the exclusionary rule. JJ;t The Court then stated: "The holding in
[Stuart's prior appeal] does not establish that the words used were chosen so as
to preclude other exceptions." JJ;t Expounding upon this determination the Court
reasoned:
[T]his Court has not previously been presented the
opportunity to examine the [exceptions relied upon by the district
court] and determine their applicability in Idaho. The United States
Supreme Court has articulated the three exceptions - independent

10

ongrn, inevitable discovery, and attenuated basis - in a line of
cases dating back to 1939. With no case law from this Court on
the subject, it cannot be presumed that this Court has decided that
the inevitable discovery and attenuated basis exceptions should
not be applied in Idaho.
ld. Having concluded that the language it used in Stuart's prior appeal was not
intended to limit the trial court's discretion, the Stuart Court held that the "law of
the case doctrine [did} not preclude the application of all three exceptions to the
exclusionary rule in [that} case."

!sL

The reasoning of Stuart is applicable to this case. As in Stuart, the Court
of Appeals in Hawkins' prior appeal "provided little discussion as to why it chose
to state" that "it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to
Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried." In fact, the statement appears in
a single concluding sentence of the Court of Appeals' opinion, unaccompanied
by any analysis or citation to authority.

See Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 783, 229

P.3d at 388. In light of the fact that the Court of Appeals did not cite or discuss
any

cases

standing

for

the

proposition

that

retroactive

competency

determinations are not possible, it does not appear that the Court intended by its
statement to limit the trial court's discretion to make a binding retroactive
competency determination on remand. This is especially true since the weight of
authority actually supports the conclusion that such determinations are possible.
As noted by the district court in its order granting the state's motion for
permissive

appeal,

the

question

of

whether

retroactive

competency

determinations are possible is an issue of first impression in Idaho. (R., p.274.)
However, numerous other jurisdictions have considered the issue and have
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determined that such determinations "are permissible whenever a court can
conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competency of the
defendant."

Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 696 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations

omitted), superseded Q.y statute on other grounds as stated in Van Tran v.
Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Duncan, 643
F.3d 1242, 1250 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Odie v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084,
1089 (9th Cir. 2001) (trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing at the time
of trial can be cured by holding a retrospective competency hearing "when the
record contains sufficient information upon which to base a reasonable
psychiatric judgment")); United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 878 (2d Cir. 1988)
("[T]he district court is in the best position to determine whether it can make a
retrospective determination of competency."); United States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d
763, 767-68 (3rd Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286 (4th
Cir. 1995) (same); Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding
retroactive competency determination where the evidence allowed for a
meaningful retrospective hearing and established defendant's competence at the
time of trial); Galowski v. Berge, 78 F.3d 1176, 1180-82 (ih Cir. 1996) (same);
Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1996) (meaningful retroactive
competency determination possible where "the state of the record, together with
such additional evidence as may be relevant and available, permits an accurate
assessment of the defendant's condition at the time"); Clayton v. Gibson, 199
F.3d 1162, 1168-72 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282,
1286-87 n.6 (11th Cir. 1996) ("nunc pro tunc competency hearing [possible], so
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long as a reliable inquiry into the defendant's competency can still be made");
accord Thompson v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.3d 406, 409 (Ky. 2001); State v.
Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176, 184-85 (Wis. 1986); State v. Sanders, 549 S.E.2d
40, 53-55 (W.Va. 2001 ); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 694 (Pa.
2004); Tate v. State, 896 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Ok. 1995); Montana v. Bostwick, 988
P.2d 765, 772-73 (Mont. 1999).
Idaho's appellate courts have never before passed on the question of
whether retroactive competency determinations are possible.

The weight of

authority from other jurisdictions indicates such determinations are possible in
appropriate circumstances.

In light of this fact, and "[w]ith no case law from

[either the Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeals} on the subject, it cannot be
presumed" that the Court of Appeals' single, concluding and unsupported
statement in Hawkins' prior appeal -i.e., that "it is not possible to retroactively
make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" actually decided the legal question of whether such determinations are
permissible in Idaho. Stuart, 136 Idaho at 495, 36 P.3d at 1283.
In addition to being unsupported by any legal authority, the Court of
Appeals' conclusory statement that "it is not possible to retroactively make a
determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" is also
contrary to the facts that have been developed on remand. When the Court of
Appeals decided Hawkins' prior appeal the only evidence it had before it was
that contained in the appellate record and transcripts of the pretrial, trial and
sentencing proceedings.

While it may not have been possible, based on this
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limited evidence, for the Court of Appeals to discern whether Hawkins was
competent at the time he was tried, there is now substantial evidence in the
record that shows such a determination is, in fact, possible.
Since the Court of Appeals' decision, Hawkins has been evaluated by two
mental health experts, both of whom opined that Hawkins is presently competent
to be tried. (11/12/1 0 Tr., p.16, L.6- p.46, L.5, p.53, L.2- p.54, L.2, p.68, L.20p.95, L.3.) One of the experts, Dr. Estess, also testified that he and his staff had
frequent contact with Hawkins while he was confined in the Ada County Jail
pending his January 2008 trial. (11/12/10 Tr., p.62, L.8- p.63, L25.) Based on
those interactions and his comprehensive review of other information bearing on
Hawkins' competency (including the trial transcripts and information pertaining to
Hawkins' prior social, institutional, and mental health history) Dr. Estess opined
"to a reasonable degree of medical certainty" that Hawkins was "perfectly
competent" when he stood trial in January 2008.
p.67, L.17, p.97, L.6 - p.100, L.13.)

(11/12/10 Tr., p.64, L.14-

Thus, the record now is substantially

different than the record presented in relation to Hawkins' prior appeal, including
the fact that the district court has now found by clear and convincing evidence
that Hawkins was competent at the time he was tried in 2008. While the Court of
Appeals may have intended its statement that ''it is not possible to retroactively
make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" to
guide the district court's discretion, nothing about the statement suggests that
the Court intended to preclude the district court from making a different finding in
light of additional facts developed in the competency hearing that followed. In
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other words, there is nothing about the Court of Appeals' statement that
suggests it is actually "law of the case" to which the trial court must adhere.
The district court has found by clear and convincing evidence that
Hawkins was competent when he was tried in January 2008. (R., pp.135-36.) If,
as the state contends, the Court of Appeals' statement that "it is not possible" to
retroactively determine Hawkins' competency is not "law of the case," the trial
court's finding would obviate any need for a retrial.

Requiring such a retrial,

when there is authority and evidence that supports the trial court's retroactive
competency determination, would be an extreme waste of time and resources.
This is especially true given the trial court's concern that, if retried, Hawkins will
engage in the same obstructionist behavior he exhibited during his first trial that
ultimately led Court of Appeals to conclude there existed a bona fide doubt about
his competency:
The defendant continues in his pro se status after an
extensive Faretta inquiry and there is a very high likelihood his
competency will continue to come into question at a new trial and
would require the Court to have a psychiatrist present during the
trial, in the event that the defendant were to act out in some
manner that on an appellate record would appear to be a loss of
competence. Assuming that the appellate courts of Idaho were to
allow a retroactive competency determination to be dispositive in
this case as well as potentially other cases, the State would need
not to retry the defendant if the court so rules.
(R., pp.274-75.

2

)

Because it appears under established principles of law that the

Court of Appeals' concluding statement in Hawkins' prior appeal is not "law of the

2

Notably, since the district court ruled on the issue of his competency, Hawkins
has filed numerous motions in the district court, including two motions for a new
or reopened competency hearing. (See R., pp.258-63, 292, 295, 345.)
15

case," the district court's order finding that it was prevented by "law of the case"
from making a retroactive competency determination should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse that portion of the
district court's December 6, 2010 Order Regarding Defendant's Competence in
which the district court found it was prevented by "law of the case" from making a
binding retrospective determination of Hawkins' competence to stand trial, and
remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 29th day of December 2011.

?oh~ Ffli~SfS
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of December 2011, served
a true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

LORI A. FLEMING

Deputy Attorney G : :
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